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Streszczenie 
Niniejszy artykuł omawia cele rosyjskiego zaangażowania w Syrii w dwa lata po tym, jak przybrało ono 
formę bezpośredniej interwencji wojskowej. Argumentujemy, że polityka Rosji na Bliskim Wchodzie jest 
zorientowania na znacznie szerszy zakres celów niż tylko regionalne i dlatego nie można jej oceniać tylko 
poprzez tam zachodzące wydarzenia. Oceniając natomiast możliwy przyszły rozwój wypadków sądzimy, 
że Rosja preferuje możliwie niskokosztową drogę do osiągania wielu szczegółowych celów, na ile są one 
możliwe w danym momencie. A zatem Kreml jest przede wszystkim nastawiony na reagowania na 
zmieniającą się sytuację w celu osiągnięcia taktycznych korzyści. 
Słowa kluczowe: stosunki międzynarodowe ● bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe ● Bliski Wschód ● 
Rosja ● Syria  
 
Abstract 
This article is supposed to explain the goals of the Moscow’s involvement in Syria, two years after its 
engagement took form of direct military intervention of the Russian armed forces. We will argue that 
the Russian Federation’s policy in the Middle East is oriented to much wider scope of goals than just 
regional ones, therefore it should not be judged only by the conduct of events there. Assessing 
the possible future, we hold that Russia appears to prefer a cost-effective way to achieve multitude 
of specific goals, if they are deemed possible to accomplish at the moment. So, the Kremlin is first of all 
prepared to react to the changing situation for tactical advantages.  
Keywords: international relations ● international security ● Middle East ● Russian Federation ● Syria 
 
Introduction 
By the end of September 2015 the Russian air force started executing combat sorties in Syria. 
Soon it appeared that it was a part of a well-prepared, complex operation encompassing also 
an extensive assistance to the Syrian armed forces and close co-operation with Iran. Now1, 
more than two years on, it looks like this effort has paid off – Moscow strengthened its Middle 
Eastern influence and positioned itself as a main arbiter of the conflict in Syria. Furthermore, 
since Russia’s Levantine endeavour was apparently a part of wider strategy, its success has also 
translated into some achievements of the Russian Federation as a global player. With respect 
                                                          
1 This article was completed by the end of 2017. 
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to the latter, many observers maintain that the Kremlin is actually carrying on well-developed, 
comprehensive strategy poised to expand its leverage in the world. This plan, as the narrative 
goes, is more or less centered on exploiting weaknesses and cracks in the international system 
and domestic troubles of individual states. And so, Moscow moves everywhere it sees 
an opportunity to create some commotion, even if it does not always mean gaining direct 
advantage. From longtime involvement in U.S. politics2, through alleged hostile interference in 
many regions like Europe3 or Middle East4, to the wars in Ukraine5 and Syria6, Russia 
is successfully advancing its interests as the West’s power and international sway 
simultaneously dwindle. 
Other analysts agree with the above only to a certain extent. So it is true that as 
abundant crises have undermined the international order, Russia certainly has been able to 
exacerbate them. Thus, Moscow seems to be gaining ground in some regions either by adding 
up to the weakening of its perceived foes and competitors, or by directly benefiting from 
an open or clandestine involvement (or both). However, it must be stressed that in every 
instance of recent achievements the Kremlin was only dexterously catching opportunities 
as they came, instead of actively creating the overall conditions to alter regional balances 
in its favour. It is also often said that all those wins are rather short-lived and do not have clear 
potential for long-term decisive gains7 - especially in light of Russia’s difficult internal situation. 
In brief, Moscow does demonstrate to be highly proficient in setting tactical goals and in 
achieving them, but the broad strategy regarding the Russian Federation’s place in the world is 
                                                          
2 A. Entous, E. Nakashima, G. Jaffe, Kremlin trolls burned across the Internet as Washington debated options, “The 
Washington Post”, 25 December 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kremlin-trolls-
burned-across-the-internet-as-washington-debated-options/2017/12/23/e7b9dc92-e403-11e7-ab50-
621fe0588340_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_infowars-
250pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.eab70a9905a5 (accessed 26 December 2017). 
3 D. Priest, M. Birnbaum, Europe has been working to expose Russian meddling for years, “The Washington Post”, 
25 June 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-has-been-working-to-expose-russian-
meddling-for-years/2017/06/25/e42dcece-4a09-11e7-9669-
250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.6638960f24d2 (accessed 26 June 2017). 
4 E. Perez, S. Prokupecz, CNN Exclusive: US suspects Russian hackers planted fake news behind Qatar crisis, “CNN”, 
7 June 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/russian-hackers-planted-fake-news-qatar-
crisis/index.html (accessed 8 June 2017). 
5 R. F. Johnson, Russian forces ‘now 11,000 strong in the Donbass’, “Jane’s 360”, 6 October 2017, 
http://www.janes.com/article/74682/russian-forces-now-11-000-strong-in-the-donbass (accessed 16 December 
2017). 
6 В. Литовкин, Победа близка как никогда, “Независимое Военное Обозрение”, 27 October 2017, 
http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2017-10-27/1_971_siria.html (accessed 16 December 2017). 
7 F. Wesslau, A. Wilson, Russia 2030: A Story of Great Power Dreams and Small Victorious Wars, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, London, May 2016.  
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highly vague, especially in terms of sustainable instruments and methods of achieving long-
term objectives. We tend to concur with this line of argument. 
This article is supposed to explain the goals of Moscow’s involvement in Syria in a broad 
context of Russia’s foreign strategy and offer a forecast regarding future developments. We will 
argue that Russian policy in the Middle East is oriented to a much wider scope of goals than 
just regional ones, therefore it should not be judged only by the conduct of events there.  
The Goals of Russia’s Involvement to Date – a Recap 
Since its onset the Russian military involvement in Syria has had multiple goals, from local, 
tactical to broad, long-term strategic ones; from those centered on the Middle East to the ones 
related to foreign policy as a whole and to Russia’s internal situation. Since the very beginning 
it also has been visible that while specific short-term goals seemed precise and achievable, 
general perspectives were much more vague and elusive. 
The first, immediate goal of the Russian intervention in the Levant, the one clearly 
declared and used to justify the whole adventure, was to keep Syrian president Bashar al-Assad 
in power. The Kremlin maintained that the legitimate authorities in Damascus were being 
overwhelmed by foreign-sponsored terrorist forces. Therefore, in compliance with 
international law, Moscow offered Syria assistance crucial to its very survival and sovereignty. 
This task was achieved, al-Assad was rescued, but for the most part thanks to very 
favorable circumstances. Firstly, Russians did not have to employ large ground forces save 
mercenaries, special operation forces and artillery support units8 – the greatest part 
of the fighting rested on the Syrian army and foreign fighters, such as the battle-hardened 
Hezbollah combat force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) with its proxy 
militias. Secondly, Russian artillery and attack aircrafts operated freely without major 
constraint, which allowed them to level whole cities and literally bury enemy soldiers in rubbles, 
together with the civilian population. Thirdly, the strongest enemy, the Islamic State (IS) has 
been defeated by the Americans, Iraqis and Kurds both on the ground and in terms of financial 
support – all the Syrian army’s progress against the IS, especially during the last months of 2017, 
was possible due to an earlier rout of the Islamic State’s forces and the demolition of its 
infrastructure, both in material and financial terms. 
                                                          
8 War zone Syria: Russian and US interventions assessed, “Jane’s” 2017, p. 6,  
http://www.janes.com/images/assets/815/75815/War_zone_Syria_Russian_and_US_interventions_assessed.pd
f (accessed 28 December 2017). 
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This success was obscured to an extent by the fact that large parts of Syria are still 
in hands of rebel forces. Furthermore, from the very beginning it was not exactly clear 
if the Kremlin was determined to “liberate” whole country in one big effort. We thought9 that 
Russians were rather interested in cantonizing Syria, because the whole process of recapturing 
its territory would have been too expensive and too long, giving not much in return. Now, 
at the beginning of 2018, this prediction seems to be correct. Moscow has indeed brought anti-
rebel operations to the point where al-Assad is able to govern over relatively unified territory 
that represents roughly two thirds of entire Syria. But it is noteworthy that the last phase 
of military operations, conducted in late Summer and Autumn of 2017, was directed almost 
exclusively against the Islamic State, leaving the remaining rebel-held enclaves in relative 
peace. Russia also strengthened its presence in Syria by enhancing formal partnership 
and expanding its military installations capable of stationing substantial combat forces 
on a permanent basis. This way the Syrian president is kept relatively weak and dependent, 
what further helps Russia to secure its own beachhead in Syria. 
Thus, as the most violent phase of the Syrian conflict draws to an end, Moscow’s primary 
goals seem to be achieved – the country is weak and fragmented, its authorities dependent on 
Russia’s regular help10 and the Kremlin has a lot of opportunities to divide and rule. Currently 
it seems to be focused rather on seeking a political accommodation with rebel factions than on 
trying to overwhelm them, at least for the time being. 
The second set of Russian goals was related to the wider problem of Moscow’s influence 
in the Middle East as a whole. First of all, al-Assad was the last Russia’s ally there, so Moscow 
certainly could not afford to lose him. Syrian president’s fall would have been a disastrous blow 
to the Kremlin’s credibility in the region and would have meant more or less a final farewell 
to the Levant. Therefore, in light of al-Assad’s apparent demise, Russia had little choice 
but to act, even if it meant a problematic military involvement in a distant overseas territory. 
Thus, “[b]y propping up one of the region’s most vilified leaders, Moscow [was] sending 
a powerful message about its willingness to act aggressively in a region where many 
of America’s closest allies [were] feeling insecure”11. Rescuing al-Assad from an imminent 
                                                          
9 M. Czajkowski, Rosja (nie) wycofuje się z Syrii, “Komentarze ZBN” 2016, no. 7 (16) (16 March). 
10 Rosyjscy doradcy w każdej jednostce syryjskich sił rządowych, “Defence24.pl”, 27 December 2017, 
http://www.defence24.pl/719218,rosyjscy-doradcy-w-kazdej-jednostce-syryjskich-sil-rzadowych (accessed 
28 December 2017). 
11 C. Lynch, Why Putin Is So Committed to Keeping Assad in Power, “Foreign Policy”, October 7, 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/putins-russia-is-wedded-to-bashar-al-assad-syria-moscow/ (accessed 
21 December 2017). 
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catastrophe was therefore a clear signal to regional leaders that Russia was ready to seek their 
friendship in an exchange for assistance if needed. Owing to chaos spreading in the Middle East 
and the American relative disengagement from regional affairs, such an offer could have been 
considered tempting by many beleaguered governments or some ambitious sub-state actors. 
By creating a stable foothold in the Middle East, Russia indeed has become one 
of the regional powers but its real weight is yet to be measured. Right now it has demonstrated 
some military capabilities and organizational skills, but on the other hand the success in Syria is 
still relative – the country remains divided. That is why Moscow’s influence in the Middle East 
is still unsettled and it is unclear what kind of regional sway Russia will be able to hammer out 
in the coming years – controlling the greater part of Syria does not automatically give 
it a region-wide leverage. It might even be argued that the relative success in Syria was possible 
just because the real goals were limited. Russian meddling in the Libyan civil war 
or the Egyptian12, Saudi13 or other diplomatic overtures do not change this picture. Regional 
leaders have approached Russia with great caution because it is widely considered an unreliable 
partner and the one whose hand might be too heavy to bear, and in fact less potent than 
the United States. Hence, a lot depends on the abilities of the Russian diplomacy to tackle with 
deep-seated interests of ambitious regional powers and this is not an easy thing to do. 
The third dimension of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy reflected the Kremlin’s general 
goals within the international realm. The most profound of them was a vehemently expressed 
claim, based on many historical, ideological, political and economic motives, that Russia actually 
was the global superpower and should have been treated accordingly. Furthermore, there was 
a generally agreed assessment that the country was endangered in its very existence by the 
ongoing Western encroachment which climaxed in the crossing of the last fault lines in Ukraine 
– developments there were considered as a genuine aggression against Russia. 
From this point of view, a successful re-emergence in the Middle Eastern arena was 
supposed to make Russia an indispensable partner and a power to be reckoned with. In turn, 
it was expected to compel Western countries to come to terms with Moscow in other places, 
such as Europe. In that sense the Syrian gambit was a part of a broader counteroffensive aimed 
                                                          
12 W. Rodkiewicz, Rosja: umacnianie wpływów w Egipcie, “Analizy OSW”, 13 December 2017, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-12-13/rosja-umacnianie-wplywow-w-egipcie (accessed 
14 December 2017). 
13 S. Kardaś, W. Rodkiewicz, Szczyt rosyjsko-saudyjski, “Analizy OSW”, 11 October 2017, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-10-11/szczyt-rosyjsko-saudyjski (accessed 24 December 
2017). 
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against the West which also encompassed an increased interference in internal affairs of many 
countries, including the United States14, along with belligerent rhetoric15, aggressive military 
actions16, sudden exercises of massive armed forces17 and hostile cyber operations18. Currently 
it looks like this goal has been achieved to a certain extent, although not entirely the way Russia 
wanted it to. The West was indeed forced to accommodate with Russia in the Middle East, 
but on the other hand it got scared by the scope and bluntness of the Russian aggression. 
Currently it appears that the main Western powers are not going to step back too much under 
Russian pressure. On the contrary, the West seemingly finds itself in a phase of consolidation 
against Moscow (which of course may not19 be accomplished), because it recognizes that Russia 
moved too far in questioning the basics of the world order. In a generally shared opinion, 
the Kremlin became not just a competitor but it rather achieved the status of an adversary. 
In short, the Syrian operation understood as a sort of offensive defense20 bound to repel 
Western trespassing surely worked, along with other means that the Kremlin undertook. 
So, the West is now generally in a defensive mode, but this is also due to internal problems that 
include above all European economic woes and self-destruction of the U.S. foreign policy. 
One has also to take into account the broadest conceptual context of all Russian 
international activities which we label as the “realist-futurist” mindset, that has apparently 
been present in Moscow’s worldview for some time and echoed in a rationale behind the Syrian 
intervention. This narrative stemmed primarily from a conclusion that the Western-centric 
world order was crumbling, and the rule-based international environment was swiftly 
deteriorating. Power politics made a spectacular comeback and yet another reshuffle 
in the global system commenced. Those actors who got to understand it and would be ready 
to throw away constraints soon enough would take part in the shaping of a new world order 
                                                          
14 See for example: L. Rosenberger, J. Fly, Shining More Light Every Day on Russia’s Political Interference, “War on 
the Rocks”, 13 November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/shining-light-every-day-russias-political-
interference/ (accessed 28 December 2017). 
15 M. Kaprāns, Russia ratchets up rhetoric in the Baltics, http://infowar.cepa.org/Briefs/Lv/Russia-ratchets-up-
rhetoric-in-the-Baltics (accessed 24 December 2017). 
16 B. Jones, Aerial confrontation increases over the Baltic Sea, “Jane’s 360”, 26 June 2017, 
http://www.janes.com/article/71756/aerial-confrontation-increases-over-the-baltic-sea (accessed 27 June 2017). 
17 L. Litzenberger, Beyond Zapad 2017: Russia’s Destabilizing Approach to Military Exercises, “War on the Rocks”, 
28 November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/beyond-zapad-2017-russias-destabilizing-approach-
military-exercises/ (accessed 29 November 2017). 
18 S. Sukhanin, Russian ‘Cyber Troops’: A Weapon of Aggression, “Eurasia Daily Monitor” 2017, vol. 14, no. 63, 
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-cyber-troops-weapon-aggression/ (accessed 12 December 2017). 
19 G. Gressel, F. Wesslau, The Great Unraveling: Four Doomsday Scenarios for Europe’s Russia Policy, “Policy Brief” 
no. ECFR/221, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, June 2017. 
20 P. Felgenhauer, NATO and US: Enemies of Choice for Russia’s Military, “Eurasia Daily Monitor” 2017, vol. 14, no. 
72, https://jamestown.org/program/nato-us-enemies-choice-russias-military/ (accessed 25 May 2017). 
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and benefit greatly from it. If this narrative is correct, the Russian strategy as a whole, 
and the Syrian gambit specifically, has been paying off, but it is rather difficult to appraise 
it in full at the moment. 
Moreover, Syria was supposed to become a live-fire proving ground21 for armaments 
and tactics of the resurgent Russian army in its newly appointed role of a long-range instrument 
of foreign policy. Beside the long-standing conventional military presence in the post-Soviet 
area, Moscow wanted to create a new tool of intervention in more remote regions in order 
to emulate American capacity to do just that. The military in its expeditionary function 
was supposed to become Russia’s indispensable instrument in the unstable world, capable 
to be effectively used when and where necessary. This goal is rather long-term in nature, 
but there is no doubt that the Syrian operation has already yielded many positive gains with 
respect to that22. By all means, the Russian chain of command and the logistic systems have 
matured, together with innovative tactics and effectiveness of the use of various weaponry. 
The fourth, and probably most important, goal of the intervention in Syria may be found 
in the internal politics of Russia. We argued on many occasions23 that an essential task of the 
entire Russian foreign policy was to create and maintain a limited conflict with the West 
in order to rally society around the authorities. It was necessary since the previous 
legitimization mechanism, so-called “Putin’s consensus”, started to wane by the end of the first 
decade of the 21st century. It had been based on a relative economic success of the 2000s that 
allowed society to get enriched, but sources of this development were finally depleted, 
and something else was needed. The external threat seemed to be a good tool of legitimization 
of the government24, and the Syrian gambit had its role in this strategy – it was very important 
for a rally-under-the-flag strategy to prove that those in charge were really capable to defend 
the frightened people. Hence, a successful military operation was to serve as a demonstration 
of power of the country, of strength and proficiency of its military, and of resolve and skills 
of the authorities. So far it has worked very well, Russian society has responded very well to this 
storyline, for it also satisfies the Russians’ national pride. Of course, this success has been 
                                                          
21 О. Владыкин, Stratfor оценил Сирию как полигон РФ, “Независимое Военное Обозрение”, 27 October 2017, 
http://nvo.ng.ru/nvoevents/2017-10-27/2_971_news3.html (accessed 28 October 2017). 
22 R. McDermott, High-Technology Set to Dominate Russia’s Rearmament Program, “Eurasia Daily Monitor” 2017, 
vol. 14, no. 154, https://jamestown.org/program/high-technology-set-dominate-russias-rearmament-program/ 
(accessed 30 November 2017). 
23 See for example: M. Czajkowski, Kremlin’s Survival Strategy – The International Dimension, in: A. Podraza (ed.), 
A Transatlantic or European Perspective of World Affairs: NATO and the European Union Towards the Problems of 
International Security in the 21st Century, Madrid 2017, pp. 141-157. 
24 E. Rumer, R. Sokolsky, A.S. Weiss, Trump and Russia, “Foreign Policy”, March/April 2017, p. 13. 
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achieved to a great extent due to a well-crafted message broadcasted by the Russian state-
controlled media25, carefully managed by skilled propagandists. 
And finally, there were also some goals regarding international and internal image 
of Russia. In the external dimension, the Syrian operation was supposed to rise the country’s 
overall prestige by showing its military might and efficiency in the execution of a complex 
strategy in a difficult area. This worked well, especially with regard to undemocratic 
governments that might seek some rapprochement with Russia as it proved to be able 
to staunchly oppose Washington on its allegedly own turf. The successful intervention in Syria 
was also supposed to distract internal and external public from real problems of Russia – 
a weakening and vulnerable country unable to become a real superpower, but desperately 
willing to look like one. This goal has also been partially achieved, as expected, especially with 
regard to the domestic public; but in the global information sphere a lot of comments that 
seem to take the notion that Russia did renew its superpower status as face value appeared as 
well. On the other hand, there is of course strong anti-Russian alarmism and frequent experts’ 
and politicians’ remarks on the Russian full-fledged expansionism. This tone for the most part 
is set to mobilize public support for defensive efforts, but also to heat up political atmosphere 
in order to induce gains for persons or organizations interested in ongoing securitization of the 
relations with Russia. It was also expected that well-televised advertising showcases of 
effectiveness of the Russian weaponry facilitated by the Syrian operation would prove 
advantageous for arms exports26. Russia did demonstrate to be able to do things which were 
until now reserved almost solely for the U.S. military, but we will have to wait until it is 
translated into actual contracts. 
The Future of Russia’s Syrian Policy – A Broad Perspective 
A distinguished Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin has recently observed that: 
“[b]ringing peace to Syria will be no less difficult than winning a war there. Russia faces 
another uphill task, one where its assets are less compelling, and where its competitors 
have more resources, and its situational allies—in Damascus, Tehran, and Ankara—will 
                                                          
25 A. Ferris-Rotman, Primetime Politics, “Foreign Affairs”, 12 October 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2017-10-12/primetime-politics?cid=int-
lea&pgtype=hpg (accessed 14 October 2017). 
26 Demonstracja siły czy "reklama"? Kalibry przeciwko IS z powierzchni i spod wody, “Defence24.pl”, 31 May  2017, 
http://www.defence24.pl/603306,demonstracja-sily-czy-reklama-kalibry-przeciwko-is-z-powierzchni-i-spod-
wody (accessed 1 June 2017). 
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seek to promote their own agendas, which are sometimes at odds with Moscow’s. 
Succeeding on the diplomatic front will be even harder than winning on the battlefield.”27 
We tend to concur with this appraisal. Russia is by no means a winner that takes all or a nascent 
hegemon in the Middle East. The future is not so bright, although it will probably bring Russia 
some gains but rather not decisive ones from the point of view of core interests of the state. 
On the other hand the engagement in Syria will probably induce a lot of nuisance and will result 
in many setbacks, as it will likely turn into an long-term and complicated entanglement. 
Looking from the most general perspective, we maintain that Russia’s goals and aims in 
Syria are manifold, and if accomplished they are supposed to positively impact many fields of 
Russian interests. However, as there is no single reason of this involvement, the most 
immediate tactical gains are easier to identify than the strategic ones. They are also more 
achievable because the short-term planning is apparently one of the Russians’ best assets. 
We will try to assess the future of Russian policy in Syria and beyond, referring to the list 
of goals presented in the paragraph above. 
The first perspective relates to Syria itself, and here we uphold the view that Moscow 
is ready to “cantonize” Syria, at least de facto and at least for the time being. It is rather not 
in its interest to promote any lasting or final solution – there are four reasons to think so. Firstly, 
the experience gained in the post-Soviet area demonstrates that conflicts deliberately left 
unresolved (or frozen) allow maintaining long-term influence at a relatively low cost. This 
is mainly because such a solution means leaving local authorities weak and dependent 
on military and/or political help. Furthermore, a partition of the state gives many opportunities 
to exploit it politically by distributing assistance to parties to the conflict. Therefore, a divided 
country or countries immersed in a perpetuated struggle remain under Russian influence, 
which would otherwise be much weaker. A good example is the Armenian-Azeri conflict in 
which Russia openly supports Erevan but also supplies weapons to Baku; Moscow also provides 
virtually no effort to promote a lasting political solution that would enable resuming normal 
relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In effect we can see that both of them are unable 
to live without Russia or leave its sphere of influence. 
Secondly, any final solution including re-unification of Syria would have to permanently 
involve some important players, such as Iran or Turkey, and probably Israel as well. All of these 
                                                          
27 D. Trenin, Putin's Plan for Syria; “Foreign Affairs”, 13 December 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-12-13/putins-plan-syria?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg (accessed 
14 December 2017). 
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actors have their own agendas and none could be either accommodated or outmaneuvered 
easily. For example, Iran has its long-standing policy of establishing its domination in the Middle 
East. Therefore it uses the Syrian involvement as an opportunity to create enduring presence 
of the IRGC there28. This is rather irreconcilable with security interests of Israel29 and opposite 
to the very notion of sovereign unity of Syria. Even if a permanent power-sharing agreement 
were promoted by Moscow, the problem of institutionalizing Iranian influence would be 
difficult to solve. It is because Tehran’s government and IRGC would surely tend to use influence 
gained on Syrian soil for their own purposes, not necessarily consistent with Russian goals and 
the principle of future Syria’s lasting stability. Negotiating the way Iranians would use their 
presence in Syria, and sustaining agreement if reached, would pose enormous challenges to 
Russian diplomacy. It is worth noting that the Iranian problem is just one piece of the Syrian 
puzzle, others are similarly difficult, but there is no place to describe them here in detail. 
Thirdly, de-escalation of the confrontation between pro-Assad forces and the most 
of rebel groups in Syria allowed them to strengthen and entrench – especially the Kurds gained 
ground and regional weight at the expense of the IS. To break them now, even one by one, 
would require a great deal of effort and probably would be very difficult in foreseeable 
circumstances. It would require either an enormous increase of Russian involvement, despite 
the December 2017 announcement of the end of combat operations, or relying more and more 
on the above-mentioned alliances – both perspectives are rather not attractive in terms 
of possible gains. 
And fourthly, there is no need that Russia force a permanent settlement of the conflict 
and this is the key point. A partial solution that would stabilize situation at least for the time 
being seems to serve other goals that transcend regional perspective well enough at 
a reasonable price. As we have written above, Moscow looks beyond Syria in the Middle East 
and elsewhere – the involvement there is just one of the instruments of the Kremlin’s general 
strategy. Thus, what Russia wants now is merely relative stability in Syria that will provide a solid 
base for the further expansion of its influence in the Middle East. Cessation of hostilities and 
well-televised rebuilding efforts will also add up to Russia’s international prestige and 
                                                          
28 A. Vatanka, Iran and Russia, Growing Apart, “Foreign Affairs”, 29 November 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-29/iran-and-russia-growing-apart?cid=int-
lea&pgtype=hpg (accessed 30 November 2017). 
29 P. K. Baev, Declaring Victory in Syria, Putin Stands to Lose the Elusive Peace; “Eurasia Daily Monitor” 2017, vol. 
14, no. 152, https://jamestown.org/program/declaring-victory-syria-putin-stands-lose-elusive-peace/ (accessed 
28 November 2017). 
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furthermore show effectiveness of Moscow’s foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the alleged U.S. 
ineffectiveness. 
In short, we think that the state of relative flux in Syria is probably what the Russians 
consider to be in their best interest. That is why they currently concentrate efforts 
on strengthening their own position by seeking a political solution that would ensure relative 
stability in divided Syria without delivering anything close to the final resolution of the conflict. 
A question remains whether such favourable conditions that Russians want to create 
are achievable. Will “cantonization” of Syria work in a way it is supposed to do? Now, in fact, 
when full-fledged military operations are over, the developments seem to depend less on 
Russia and more on local players. Such actors as Iran or Turkey may have more instruments 
of influence since the air superiority, elite special operations forces or sophisticated means 
of reconnaissance are not so much in need any more. Especially Iran might prove to be less 
manageable as it will pursue its own goals, of which the creation of land corridors 
to the Mediterranean is of paramount importance30. Future developments in Syria may also 
yield a lot of events unforeseeable at the moment. Therefore, the Syrian foundations 
of the Russian Middle Eastern influence may prove much less solid than expected and much 
more demanding in terms of allocation of political as well as military resources, which are by the 
way not in abundance while the country’s budget dwindles31. 
The second, regional, perspective refers to the further widening of Russian influence 
in the Middle East. Achieving this goal would need more instruments and would be much more 
difficult than a limited military intervention in tactically advantageous circumstances. While 
hammering its military action into the long-term and comprehensive region-wide political 
influence, Russia will have to prove its ability to produce lasting outcomes, not only to exploit 
opportunities with short-term gains in sight. To build a network of relations is not easy, 
especially if it would need to accommodate many partners and address many difficult 
and intertwined problems. Such a process would also be long and costly, and would bring 
rather vague outcomes. It is therefore possible that Russia will still seek a greater influence 
in the Middle East yet only by exploiting emerging opportunities, not through a concentrated 
                                                          
30 E. Yarri, Iran's Ambitions in the Levant, “Foreign Affairs”, 1 May 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-05-01/irans-ambitions-levant (accessed 2 May 2017). 
31 M. Pyadushkin, Russian Spending Cuts Limit Military Procurement, “Aviation Week and Space Technology”, 11 
December 2017, http://aviationweek.com/defense/russian-spending-cuts-limit-military-procurement?NL=AW-
19&Issue=AW-19_20171211_AW-
19_779&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_3&utm_rid=CPEN1000001539178&utm_campaign=12935&utm_medium=e
mail&elq2=206ddd2a5cbf4abd86c82cb9fa530a94 (accessed 12 December 2017). 
 
29 
 
long-term effort based on a comprehensive and detailed strategy. This is consistent with what 
we have referred to as the “realist-futurist” thinking. If this narrative is correct, and we strongly 
believe so, Moscow believes that the Middle Eastern order, or what is left of it, is crumbling. 
This would mean that the Kremlin considers any lasting outcome impossible even to devise 
at the moment, as it is hard to predict all the developments in such a liquid situation. That 
is why Russia, figuratively, sits and waits, ready to use up opportunities as they appear to gain 
as much influence as they can at the lowest possible cost. 
The third, worldwide, context of the Syrian operation does not change as Russia’s 
permanent objective is to take a position of the world-class superpower32. This is the centuries-
old tradition and the basic policy imperative that stems from long-established conviction that 
Russia does occupy a unique position in the world, therefore it is not subject to substantial 
fluctuations. 
More specifically it is clear now that Russian leaders notice the grave and existential 
threat from outside that is projected also onto the whole country. First of all, and it is clearly 
articulated in Russia, Moscow considers the West as a hostile entity with the strategic goal 
of destroying the country or at least subduing it33. The developments in Ukraine, understood 
in Moscow as the crossing of the last fault lines, are quoted as a clear evidence of this 
aggression, along with NATO’s expansion and other similar events. However bizarre it would 
look like, many within Russia’s elites, and a wider part of society, actually believe that the West 
prepares for military action along with other means of destruction of Russia. Such thinking 
is not only a remnant of the Cold-War mindset but it is also deeply rooted in the nation’s culture 
that cultivates centuries-old and propaganda-hardened distrust of the West. This view is also 
being carefully managed and intensified by the state’s disinformation apparatus. 
Deeper and in fact more rational origins of fear of the West refer to the Russian 
authorities themselves. An eastbound advance of the European and American political 
and economic influence meant above all a promotion of the Western patterns of organization 
of the state and society which were completely contrary to the Eastern traditional notion 
of the government as a sort of owner of the country it rules over. In that sense Ukraine’s fast 
forwarded rapprochement with the West was actually the last flash of the warning sign that 
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demanded an immediate response. That is why Russia, as we have already noticed, embarked 
on the strategy of limited confrontation with the West. Right now, however, it gradually looks 
less limited and more confrontational34. It is very probable that the initial goal of warning 
opponents and bringing them to cooperation under Russian conditions has been effectively 
abandoned. Thus, Moscow does not seek long-term accommodation anymore but is rather 
gearing up for a prolonged conflict with the frequent use of military instruments of its foreign 
policy35. 
That is why we will witness more and more Russian anti-Western activities, especially 
as the understanding of Moscow’s motives will grow in the West, along with a firmer stance 
against Russia. But we also believe that the Kremlin is not going to go into a full-scale conflict 
anytime soon, because it would be too costly and difficult to sustain. Russia’s in fact defensive 
posture36, even if it manifests itself very offensively, will dictate rather careful application 
of assets at its disposal. The Kremlin will therefore seek to take opportunities as they come, 
instead of undertaking a risky total confrontation, especially in light of Russia’s economic 
dependence on the global market. 
A careful wait-and-see attitude with no clear vision of long-term solutions is being 
executed not only because of the defensive nature of Russia’s resurgence, but it stems also 
from the “realist-futurist” mindset, as we have argued above. However, it is not necessarily 
a correct strategy, for we still do not know if the current world order really crumbles completely 
or it is only changing somehow its shape. Most probably, it rather transforms from a western-
centric to a polycentric system, but it is not entirely obvious this new form will be based 
on the utter force alone. It is quite likely that crucial players, especially the new world-class 
powers like China and India will prefer a stable, rule-based environment for their own 
development. That is why it is possible that the Russian strategy of betting on destruction will 
finally not pay off well. Additionally, Moscow’s new model of warfare37 apparently 
is an increasingly important tool of foreign relations, thereby testing the latest weapons, tactics 
and operational concepts in Syria. On the other hand, it will expose this evolution to external 
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scrutiny and assessment – this will give the West a chance to get prepared against possible 
Russian actions in the future. 
The fourth dimension of the Syrian adventure, closely related to the one mentioned 
above, explains it as a component of an internal power conservation strategy. As we have 
mentioned above, the creation of a limited confrontation with the West that could be televised 
as an existential threat is more and more important given that the Russian economy stagnates 
and the authorities apparently have no clue how to put the country back on track of economic 
growth38. The external threat is the last source of legitimization of the Kremlin’s current 
tenants, and if it fails, only sheer force of repression will remain. Within this strategy, the Syrian 
operation will have its place as long as it is a limited war for a limited price. What counts in that 
perspective is only a positive appraisal of the government’s strength and ability by the Russian 
public. It will surely play this role in the future, but there is some potential to lessen its actual 
influence on the audience. As the Russian presence in Syria will become more and more 
a common thing, this trump card will wear off in a measure. Such positive impact may even 
completely evaporate if some of the key circumstances change; there may be many unexpected 
events of that sort, such as an increase in causalities in Syria or quick deterioration 
of the situation in Russia. 
Finally, there is a question of international prestige that comes out of the successful 
employment of some newest military technologies and a well-advertised unwavering stance 
against threats that are attributed to the Muslim world. Russia definitely enhanced its image 
in many countries of the world and this will continue at least to a certain extent. It also draws 
and will continue to draw an envious look from the Western right, as it is broadcasting 
the narrative of being tough and effective against disruptive forces of Islam – contrary to soft 
and weak liberal governments of the West. On the other hand, constant warmongering 
and interference will contribute to the negative image of Russia in the eyes of the mainstream 
Western public – though this is probably what Moscow does not care about. What is more 
important is that the strategy of destabilization could also bring discontent of some relevant 
counterparts, especially China. Whatever are Beijing’s long-term goals, probably it does not 
seek a rapid deterioration of the world order – the current one fitting China’s ambitions 
relatively well.  
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Conclusions 
The most intrusive assessment related to the Russian’s adventure in Syria is that they are there 
to stay. On the other hand, it seems that this involvement will remain limited, as its goals are 
in fact limited in the region itself, paying off in the other perspectives. Russia seems to prefer 
a cost-effective way to achieve multitude of specific goals, if they are deemed possible 
to accomplish at the moment. Hence, the Kremlin is prepared most of all to react to the 
changing situation for tactical advantages. More specifically, our main conclusions are as 
follows.  
1. Russia seeks to “cantonize” Syria via the promotion of a kind of political solution that 
would partially accommodate all the sides but none in full – this is supposed to grant 
Russia a role of the main arbiter in the “frozen” conflict. Such a solution is achievable but 
extremely difficult to reach and sustain. 
2. If the above-mentioned goal is achieved, Russia will gain strong influence and prestige 
in the Middle East, but it will also depend on the U.S. policy there – it is very hard 
to predict whether it will be as passive and reactive as currently is.  
3. If a relative political stabilization of Syria is not achieved, Russia will be unable 
to significantly expand its influence beyond Syria. Moscow will remain preoccupied 
by local problems and will lose its image of an effective player. 
4. In the broadest international dimension Russia and the West will remain the opposing 
sides of the conflict which will more and more resemble the Cold War39, although with 
many specific features. But both sides will make every effort not to let the situation spin 
out of control, hence the conflict will be limited. 
5. The latter perfectly fits the internal goals of the Kremlin’s strategy, as power 
preservation is in fact the main driver of its foreign policy. But small victorious wars will 
not solve inherent problems of the Russian political system and will not yield economic 
growth. Conversely, uncertainties of active engagement in the most unstable region 
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of the world have the potential to confront Russia with many unpleasant consequences 
that would aggravate its internal problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
